Abstract. Random delays are often inserted in embedded software to protect against side-channel and fault attacks. At CHES 2009 a new method for generation of random delays was described that increases the attacker's uncertainty about the position of sensitive operations. In this paper we show that the CHES 2009 method is less secure than claimed. We describe an improved method for random delay generation which does not suffer from the same security weakness. We also show that the paper's criterion to measure the security of random delays can be misleading, so we introduce a new criterion for random delays which is directly connected to the number of acquisitions required to break an implementation. We mount a power analysis attack against an 8-bit implementation of the improved method verifying its higher security in practice.
Introduction
Embedded software implementations of cryptographic algorithms are threatened by physical attacks like Differential Power Analysis (DPA) or fault injection. The simplest method of protection against such attacks consists in randomizing the flow of the operations by shuffling the order of the operations or inserting random delays composed of dummy operations. These hiding countermeasures offer less security than masking countermeasures but have smaller implementation and performance costs. For the general background on physical attacks and countermeasures we refer the reader to the book [6] .
Random delays in software. Software random delays are implemented as loops of "dummy" operations that are inserted in the execution flow of an algorithm being protected. A single delay can be removed relatively easy by static alignment of side-channel traces, e.g. with cross-correlation techniques [4] . Therefore, the execution should be interleaved with delays in multiple places. To minimize the performance overhead in this setting, individual delays should be possibly shorter. An attacker would typically face a cumulative sum of the delays between the synchronization point (which would usually be at the start or at the end of the execution) and the target event. So the cumulative delay should increase the uncertainty of an attacker about the location of the target event in time. For further discussion on random delays in software we refer the reader to [3] and [8] . We also note that elastic alignment techniques were reported in [9] to be able to reduce the effect of multiple delays. Within the scope of this paper we do not verify these techniques, assuming an attacker without elastic alignment.
Previous work. An efficient method for random delay generation in embedded software was suggested in CHES 2009 [3] under the name of Floating Mean. The central idea of the method is to generate the delays non-independently within one run of a protected algorithm. In this way, the adversary facing the effect of the cumulative sum of the delays will have to cope with much larger variance and thus will require significantly more side channel measurements compared to other methods with independently generated random delays such as [8] . We recall the Floating Mean method in Sect. 2.
Our contributions.
Here we discover that the Floating Mean method of [3] can suffer from an improper parameter choice, offering less security than expected. We perform a detailed statistical analysis of the Floating Mean method of [3] and we show how to choose correct parameters (see Sect. 3).
However these new parameters require longer delays, which means the number of delays should be relatively small to keep a reasonable performance overhead. This is not good for security because, as discussed above, in general few long delays are easier to detect and remove than multiple short delays. Therefore we propose an improved method for random delay generation which can work with short delays (Sect. 4). Our new method is easy to implement; we describe a concrete implementation in assembly language (Appendix B).
We also show that the criterion in [3] to measure the efficiency of random delays can be misleading and derive a new efficiency criterion that is informationtheoretically sound (Sect. 5). Finally, we mount a practical DPA attack against the implementation of our improved method on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller to verify its higher security. With these results, we target practical designers who implement the timing randomization countermeasures for protection of their embedded software implementations.
The Floating Mean Method
Here we recall the Floating Mean method introduced in [3] . Most methods for random delay generation use independent individual delays; in this way, the cumulative sum of many delays which an adversary is facing in an attack tends to normal distribution with the variance being the sum of variances of the individual delays. Instead the core idea of the Floating Mean method from [3] is to generate random delays non-independently, in order to increase the variance of the cumulative sum. More precisely, the delays are generated as follows: As shown in [3] the variance of the cumulative sum of the delays in an execution becomes quadratic in the number N of delays instead of linear when the delays are generated independently. This is a significant improvement over the plain independent uniform delays or the table-based method of Benoit and Tunstall [8] . An illustrative example of the distribution of the cumulative sum of 100 delays for the Floating Mean compared to other methods is illustrated by Figure 1 based on [3] . The parameters for the Floating Mean here are a = 200, b = 40; the parameters for other methods are chosen so that all the methods yield the same mean cumulative delay.
However in practice it is better to have many short random delays rather than long delays, as recommended in [3] ; this is because it is more complex to distinguish and remove many short delays than just few long delays. Therefore under this recommendation one should choose smaller values of a and b, for example a = 18 and b = 3 as used in [3] for the practical implementation. However in the next section we show that for such range of parameters the Floating Mean method provides less security than expected.
The Real Behavior of Floating Mean
In this section, we show that the Floating Mean method from [3] provides less security than expected for small a and b.
We begin with taking a detailed look at the distributions of different methods by simulating them with the exact experimental parameters used in the implementation of [3] . In Figure 2 we present histograms of the distributions for different methods. Namely, the number of delays in the sum is N = 32 and the parameters of the Floating Mean method are a = 18, b = 3. The histograms present the relative frequency of the cumulative delay against its duration 1 . We clearly see a multimodal distribution for the Floating Mean method: the histogram has a distinct shape of a saw with 16 cogs, and not a flat plateau as one would expect from [3] . These cogs are not good for security since they make it easier for an attacker to mount an attack. The classical DPA will be more efficient since the signal is concentrated on the top of the 16 cogs instead of being spread over the clock cycles. In case of an attack with windowing and integration [2] , the attacker would integrate the values around cog maximums, omit the minimums to reduce the noise (assuming noise is the same in all the points of the trace) and thus gain a reduction in the number of traces required for an attack.
Explaining the Cogs
Here we explain how cogs arise in the distribution of the Floating mean and we show how to choose the parameters to avoid the cogs.
The distribution for the Floating Mean is in fact a finite mixture [7] and variance
Therefore the probability density of the distribution for random integer m ∈ [0, a − b] can be approximated by:
where all components have the same standard deviation σ = √ V :
The cog peaks are the modes of the components, located in their means μ m . The distance between the means of successive components is μ m+1 − μ m = N . We can consider the cogs distinguishable by comparing the standard deviation σ of the components to the distance N between the means. Namely, the distribution becomes multimodal whenever σ N . In the case of practical implementation in [3] , we have a = 18, b = 3 and N = 32, which gives σ = 6.3; therefore we have σ < N which explains why the 16 cogs are clearly distinguishable in the distribution in Figure 2 . However for a = 200, b = 40 and N = 100 we get σ = 118 so σ > N which explains why the cogs are indistinguishable in Figure 1 and a flat plateau is observed instead.
Choosing Correct Parameters
From the above we derive the simple rule of thumb for choosing Floating Mean parameters. To ensure that no distinct cogs arise, parameter b should be chosen such that σ N . For sufficiently large b we can approximate σ by:
Therefore this gives the condition:
However as observed in [3] it is better to have a large number of short random delays rather than a small number of long delays; this is because rare longer delays are a priori easier to detect and remove than multiple short delays. But we see that condition (1) In other words, condition (1) contradicts the requirement of having many short random delays.
In the next section we describe a variant of the Floating Mean which does not suffer from this contradiction, i.e. we show how to get short individual random delays without having the cogs in the cumulative sum.
Improved Floating Mean
In the original Floating Mean method an integer m is selected at random in 
Analysis
We . In Appendix A we show that for a fixed m :
For a fixed m the cumulative sum of random delay durations is the sum of N independently distributed random variables. Therefore it can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution with mean:
and variance
[ the probability density of the cumulative sum can therefore be approximated by:
We have:
where σ is the same as for the original Floating Mean method.
As previously we obtain a multimodal distribution. The distance between the means of successive components is μ m +1 − μ m = N ·2 −k and the standard deviation of a component is at least σ. Therefore the cogs become indistinguishable when σ N · 2 −k which gives the condition:
instead of b √ N for the original Floating Mean. Therefore by selecting a sufficiently large k we can accommodate a large number of short random delays (large N and small b). In practice, already for k as small as 3 the effect is considerable; we confirm this practically in Sect. 5.3.
We now proceed to compute the mean and variance of the cumulative sum for random m . Let denote by S N the sum of the N delays. We have from (2): 
For large N we can neglect the term N · Var(v 1 ) which gives:
which is approximately the same as for the original Floating Mean method. As for the original Floating Mean the variance of the sum of N delays is in Θ N 2 in comparison to plain uniform delays and the method of [8] that both have variances in Θ (N ). 
Illustration
The result is shown in Figure 3 compared to the original Floating Mean. The parameters of both methods were the same as in Figure 2 : a = 18, b = 3 and N = 32. We take k = 3 for our Improved Floating Mean method. We can see that we have flattened out the cogs while keeping the same mean. This is because we still have σ 6.3 but the distance between successive cogs is now N · 2 −k = 32· 2 −3 = 4 instead of 32 so the cogs are now almost indistinguishable.
Full Algorithm
The Improved Floating Mean method is formally defined by Algorithm 1. Following [3] , by DU[y, z[ we denote discrete uniform distribution on [y, z[, y, z ∈ Z, y < z. Note that as in [3] we apply the technique of "flipping" the mean in the middle of the execution to make the duration of the entire execution independent of m . In Appendix B we show that Improved Floating Mean can be efficiently implemented on a constrained platform by describing an implementation in assembly language.
Algorithm 1. Improved Floating Mean
Input: a, b, k, M ∈ N, b ≤ a, N = 2M m ← DU[0, (a − b) · 2 k [ for i = 1 to N/2 do di ← m + DU 0, (b + 1) · 2 k · 2 −k end for for i = N/2 + 1 to N do di ← a · 2 k − m − DU 0, (b + 1) · 2 k · 2 −k end for Output: d1, d2, . . . , dN
The Optimal Criterion of Efficiency
In [3] , the ratio σ/μ called coefficient of variation was suggested as a criterion for measuring the efficiency of the random delays countermeasure, where σ is the standard deviation of the cumulative sum of the delays, and μ the mean of the cumulative sum 2 , where a higher ratio meant a better efficiency. Here we argue that this measure is misleading and suggest a new criterion.
Drawbacks of the Coefficient of Variation
We first take a closer look at the experimental data from [3] and establish consistency with the theoretical expectations. In Figure 4 (a) we present the relation between the standard deviation σ of the cumulative sum of 32 delays and the number T cpa of traces required for a successful CPA attack on the implementation without the random delays countermeasure (no delays, ND) and with different random delay generation methods: plain uniform (PU), Benoit-Tunstall (BT), Floating Mean (FM). The data were taken from Table 2 of [3] .
Following [2] and [5] one would expect that without integration, which was the case for the experiments in [3] , the number of traces grows quadratically with the standard deviation σ. However, from Figure 4 (a) one can see that T cpa exhibits growth with σ that is almost linear and not quadratic as one would have expected.
The problem is that standard deviation σ is in general a very rough way to estimate the number of traces which only works for very similar distributions (like two normal distributions). If we look at the figures in Table 2 in [3] , we will see that σ for Floating Mean is 5.3 times larger than that for the plain uniform delays. If one expects the number of traces to be in σ 2 in the attack without integration, then 5.3 2 = 28 more traces are expected to attack the Floating Mean. But observed was only 45000/2500 = 18 times increase. This means that by looking at the variance, one can overestimate the security level of the countermeasure. 2 /4, so Var(X) > Var(U ). Therefore the efficiency of X counted in σ/μ will be higher than for U . But with X the DPA signal is only divided by 2 instead of (b − a + 1) with U , so the number of traces required to break an implementation with U will be smaller than with X. So in this case the criterion from [3] is misleading.
An accurate estimate is the maximump of the probability mass function (p.m.f.)
3 of the distribution of the cumulative sum. From [2] and [5] we recall that the number of traces T required for a DPA attack is determined by the maximal correlation coefficient ρ max observed in the correlation trace for the correct key guess. Namely, the number of traces can be estimated as
where Z α is a quantile of a normal distribution for the 2-sided confidence interval with error 1−α. For ρ max < 0.2, ln max . In turn, the effect of the timing disarrangement on ρ max is inp in case no integration is used. So the number of traces is in 1/p 2 . We now computep for the distributions shown in Figure 2 and plot T cpa from [3] against 1/p in Figure 4 (b). We can now see that quadratic dependency has become clear, which can be verified by the computations:p suggests that the number of traces for the Floating Mean will be 13 times higher than for plain uniform delays. Now we have underestimation, but the relation of the number of traces top is still more accurate than to σ. Note that such calculations will not hold for the case without delays since in this case ρ max was about 0.6 (see Figure 5 in [3] ), whereas in the other cases ρ max < 0.2 holds.
The New Criterion
We propose a better criterion for the efficiency E of the random delays countermeasure:
wherep is the maximum of the probability mass function and μ is the mean of the distribution of the cumulative sum of the delays. This criterion is normalized and optimal with respect to the desired properties of the countermeasure, as shown below.
With the countermeasure, we want to maximize the number of traces in an attack, i.e. minimizep, while keeping the smallest possible overhead, i.e. smallest mean μ. One can see that from all distributions with the givenp, the one with the smallest μ is uniform on [0, 1/p]. In this case, μ = 1/(2p) and the criterion E is equal to 1. In all other cases (samep but larger μ) the value of the criterion will be smaller, and the closer to zero -the farther is the distribution from the optimal one (i.e. the uniform one).
This tightly relates the criterion to the entropy of the distribution. Namely, the new criterion is directly linked to min-entropy, which is defined for a random variable S as H ∞ (S) = − log max
Note that H ∞ (S) ≤ H(S)
, where H(S) = − i p i log p i is the Shannon entropy, so min-entropy can be considered as a worst-case measure of uncertainty. Now we havep = 2 −H∞(S) and the new efficiency criterion is expressed as
Indeed, for a fixed worst-case cumulative delay, the distributions with the higher entropy, i.e. maximizing uncertainty for the attacker, will have lowerp, larger number of traces to attack and thus more efficient as a countermeasure. This criterion is easily computable once the designer have simulated the real distribution for the concrete parameters of a method (taking into consideration the number of clock cycles per delay loop) and obtainedp.
Comparing Efficiency
In our example in Sect. 4.2 with parameters a = 18, b = 3 and N = 32, with the Improved Floating Mean (IFM) method we have decreasedp by a factor 2, as illustrated in Figure 3 . So the number of traces for the successful straightforward DPA attack will be in principle almost 4 times larger (around 160000), and according to the optimal criterion the efficiency is almost 2 times higher. Table  1 below revises Table 2 of [3] with the new criterion and the new method. We have performed a practical power analysis attack against an AES-128 implementation with the new IFM method running on ATmega16, an 8-bit AVR microcontroller. To be consistent with the previous results, the implementation and the measurement setup were as in [3] . Namely, there were 10 random delays per round, and 3 dummy rounds were added before and after the encryption, so N = 32 delays occur between the start of the execution (the synchronization point) and the 1-st S-Box lookup of the 1st encryption round the attack target. The parameters for IFM were a = 19, b = 3, k = 3. Note that a different value for a was chosen to ensure efficient implementation of the method as described in Appendix B, so the mean for IFM is larger, but still the efficiency is 1.8 times higher. We could not break this implementation by a CPA attack [1] with 150 · 10 3 traces, which corresponds to the theoretical expectations. Due to its definition, the new criterion reflects well the number of traces observed in the experimental attack. For example, looking at the new criterion we expect the number of traces for the Floating Mean be 0.145 2 /0.063 2 = 5.3 times higher than for the table method of Benoit and Tunstall [8] . In the experiment, it was 45000/7000 = 6.4 times higher.
Conclusion
We have shown that the Floating Mean method for random delay generation in embedded software [3] exhibits lower security if its parameters are improperly chosen. We have suggested how to choose the parameters of the method so that it generates a good distribution; however this requires to generate longer delays while in practice it is preferable to have multiple shorter delays. We have proposed an improved method that allows for a wider choice of parameters while having an efficient implementation. Finally, we have suggested an optimal criterion for measuring the efficiency of the random delays countermeasure.
A Distribution of Delay's Length d
Write m = m · 2 k + u with 0 ≤ u < 2 k . This gives: 
